ABSTRACT. Weighted voting games are frequently used in decision making. Each voter has a weight and a proposal is accepted if the weight sum of the supporting voters exceeds a quota. One line of research is the efficient computation of so-called power indices measuring the influence of a voter. We treat the inverse problem: Given an influence vector and a power index, determine a weighted voting game such that the distribution of influence among the voters is as close as possible to the given target value. We present exact algorithms and computational results for the Shapley-Shubik and the (normalized) Banzhaf power index.
INTRODUCTION
The European Economic Community, i. e. the predecessor of the European Union, was founded in 1957 by Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Decisions were and are made via polling. More precisely, each country has a given voting weight, see Table 1 1 , and a proposal is approved if it is supported by at least 12, called the quota, out of the 17 votes. So Luxembourg possesses 1 17 of all votes. But let us consider the following thought experiment: The five countries except Luxembourg vote for their own without asking for Luxembourg's opinion. In any case the number s of supporting votes is even. Thus the vote of Luxembourg does not matter at all. For s ≥ 12 the proposal will be approved and for s ≤ 10 the proposal will be rejected. We may say that Luxembourg has absolutely no power in this weighted voting game. To have a measurement of the relative power of the members of voting schemes in more complex situations, power indices like the Shapley-Shubik or the Banzhaf power index were invented, see the next section for a definition. Table 2 lists the values of the two mentioned power indices for three different weighted voting games. We remark that there is a non-linear dependency between weights, quota and the value of the considered power index.
If we suppose that there exists some agreement on a fair distribution of power (d i ) 1≤i≤n among the n countries and a selection of an appropriate power index P, we obtain the inverse power index problem 2 : min d − P(χ) , where χ is a weighted voting game for n voters and · an arbitrary suitable norm to measure the deviation, i. e. a rule to decide which assignment of voting weights is fairer. In practice the intended power distribution d may arise from the population numbers, either in the variant "One Person, One Vote", i. e. d i is proportional to the population of country i, or by using Penrose square root law, i. e. d i is proportional to the square root of the population of country i [20, 22] .
1.3. Outline of the paper. In Section 2 we state the definitions of the three voting methods simple games, complete simple games and weighted voting games. We further introduce the Banzhaf and the Shapley Shubik power index. The known a priori estimates are the topic of Section 3. We give precise conjectures about the, with respect to approximation via Banzhaf and Shapley Shubik vectors, worst case power distributions. In Section 4 we give an exact algorithm for the inverse power index problem for simple games, complete simple games and weighted voting games for the Banzhaf and the Shapley Shubik power index via an ILP formulation. Another exact approach via exhaustive enumeration is described in Section 5. A promising combination of both methods as a branch&bound approach is outlined in Subsection 5.1. Computational results evaluating the proposed exact algorithms for the inverse power index problem and proving the stated conjectures for small numbers of voters are given in Section 6. To get a more global understanding we consider the sets of achievable Banzhaf and Shapley Shubik vectors in Section 7 and close with a conclusion in Section 7. Additionally we classify the complete set of desired power distributions which have the worst case approximation property for very small n in an appendix.
VOTING METHODS AND POWER INDICES
Consider a yes-no voting system for a set N = {1, 2, . . . , n} of n voters. The acceptance of a proposal depends on the subset of the supporting voters. In general this can be described by a Boolean function χ : 2 N → {0, 1}. A quite natural requirement for a voting system is monotonicity, i. e. χ(U ) ≤ χ(U ) for all U ⊆ U ⊆ N . Monotone Boolean functions χ : 2 N → {0, 1} with χ(∅) = 0 and χ(N ) = 1 are called simple games.
Definition 1. For a simple game χ : 2 N → {0, 1} a subset U ⊆ N is called a minimal winning coalition if χ(U ) = 1 and χ(U \{i}) = 0 for all i ∈ U . Analogously a subset U ⊆ N is a maximal losing coalition if χ(U ) = 0 and χ(U ∪ {i}) = 1 for all i ∈ N \U .
Each simple game is completely characterized by either the complete list W of its minimal winning coalitions or the complete list L of its maximal losing coalitions. Both the set of minimal winning coalitions and the set of the maximal losing coalitions are antichains. For each simple game χ there is a dual simple game
. A voter i ∈ N is called a null voter if he is not a member of at least one minimal winning coalition.
In many applications voting systems are restricted to smaller sub classes of simple games, e. g. complete simple games arising from Isbell's desirability relation [9] : We write i j for two voters i, j ∈ N iff we have χ {i} ∪ U \{j} ≥ χ(U ) for all j ∈ U ⊆ N \{i}. A pair (N, χ) is called complete simple game if it is a simple game and the binary relation is a total preorder and we abbreviate i j, j i by i j. To factor out symmetries we assume 1 2 · · · n and write coalitions U ⊆ N as characteristic vectors u. We call u a winning vector iff χ(U ) = 1, otherwise we call u a losing vector.
To state an analogue of minimal winning coalitions for complete simple games we need another partial ordering:
For two coalitions u = u 1 . . . u n , v = v 1 . . . v n ∈ {0, 1} n we write u v iff we have
With this we have χ(u) ≤ χ(v) for all u v. By W we denote the set of all shift-minimal winning vectors, i. e. winning vectors which are minimal with respect to . Similarly we denote by L the set of all shift-maximal losing vectors, i. e. losing vectors which are maximal with respect to . We remark that each complete simple game is uniquely characterized by either W or L, see e. g. [2] . In Figure 1 we depict the Hasse diagram for on N = {1, 2, 3} and see that there are exactly 8 complete simple games (or antichains) for n = 3 voters; 7 with one shift-minimal winning vector and one with two shift-minimal winning vectors.
An even more important sub class of complete simple games are weighted voting games given by non-negatives weights w i for all i ∈ N and a quota q. The corresponding monotone Boolean function χ is obtained by
Algorithmically we can check whether a given simple game χ is a weighted voting game by solving a suitable linear program, see Section 5.
In Table 3 we state the known numbers of simple games, complete simple games and weighted voting games for n voters, see [7, 13, 23, 25] . To define two of the most important power indices for these three types of voting methods we need another definition:
Definition 2. For a voter i ∈ N and a monotone Boolean function χ, an i-swing is a set U ⊆ N \{i} such that χ(U ) = 0 and χ(U ∪ {i}) = 1. , 1) , . . . , BZ(χ, n)) as
where m is the total number of swings. Also the Shapley-Shubik vector (SS(χ, 1), . . . , SS(χ, n)) can be expressed using swings via
Since a set U is an i-swing in a simple game χ if and only if it is an i-swing in the dual game χ d , both the Shapley-Shubik vector and the Banzhaf vector coincide for pairs of dual simple games. For both power indices the value for a null voter is zero. Removing a null voter from a simple game with n voters gives a simple game with n − 1 voters, where the power indices of the remaining n − 1 voters coincide.
A PRIORI ESTIMATES
Since heuristics can only find good solutions but are not capable of providing lower bounds we are considering a priori estimates. The first fact coming to mind is the finite number of weighted voting games with n voters. An upper bound of 2 n 2 −n+2 is given in [11] . Respecting symmetry we conclude that for n ≥ 2 there are at most
subcubes of side lenght 1 2 n n results in at least one empty subcube using the pigeonhole principle. Thus there are points in [0, 1] n such that the nearest Banzhaf-or Shapley-Shubik vector is at least 1 2 n+1 n apart. Having a closer look at the swings one can obtain a slightly sharper bound. For n voters the number of swings lies between n and n 2 + 1 · n n 2 +1 , see [5] . Using the fact that the numbers η i of swings for voter i all have the same parity we can conclude that either BZ(χ, i) = BZ(χ, j) or we have
for voters i and j. Both bounds tend to zero when n tends to infinity. Recently Alon and Edelman [1] found a lower bound that does not tend to zero: Theorem 1. Let n > k be positive integers, let ε < 1 k+1 be a positive real, and let χ be a simple game for n voters. If n i=k+1 B(χ, i) ≤ ε, then there exists a simple game χ for k voters such that
Alon and Edelman have chosen k = 2 and ε = 0.01 to deduce that for a simple game with 
a closed expression for these numbers km lm , see also Table 4 , is given by
and
for m ≥ 2. Thus we have lim , 1), both for the Shapley-Shubik and the Banzhaf index. For some small n > 2 we compute the points or regions which maximize the · 1 -distance to the achievable power vectors in Appendix A. So far we have not seen a geometric structure behind the values km lm for the Banzhaf index, but computing these numbers for simple games and weighted voting games with n ≤ 16 suggests that the rather structured recursion formulas for k m and l m might be more than a pure coincidence. Having Theorem 1 in mind one might conjecture that power distributions with many zeros are hard to approximate whenever they are hard to approximate without the zero values. A first step towards understanding the inverse power index problem might be the results on achievable hierarchies in simple games, see [8] .
Additionally we conjecture that there is a similar result as Theorem 1 for the Shapley-Shubik index. In the next sections we will present some exact algorithms to solve the inverse power index problem and use them to prove Conjecture 1 for small n. 
AN ILP FORMULATION FOR THE INVERSE POWER INDEX PROBLEM
Our first exact approach to solve the inverse power index problem is to utilize an ILP formulation using ILOG CPLEX 11 as an ILP solver. Therefore let n be the number of voters and
To model the monotone Boolean function χ we use binary variables x U which equal χ(U ) for all subsets U ⊆ N . In order to express the values SS(χ, i) and BZ(χ, i) of the power indices for voter i we additionally introduce binary variables y i,U which equal one iff U is an i-swing, see Equation (5) With this we can state the Shapley-Shubik value for voter i as
and the number of i-swings as
we introduce variables δ i and obtain the following binary ILP formulation for the inverse Shapley-Shubik index problem with · 1 -norm on simple games:
Of course we may directly eliminate all variables y i,U and p i from this formulation. The equations and inequalities (6), (7), (8), and (9) enforce that χ is a simple game. To restrict χ to complete simple games only small adjustments are necessary: We replace the subsets U ⊆ N by its characteristic vectors u ∈ {0, 1} n and rewrite Inequality (6) to x u ≤ x v for all u, v ∈ {0, 1} n with u v, or more economically to
where → v denotes the set of elements arising from v by an right-shift of one of the rightmost 1s in v. Examples are given by
To restrict χ to weighted voting games we additionally have to introduce weights w i ≥ 0 and a quota q > 0. To be able to decide whether i∈U w i ≥ q or i∈U w i < q in the framework of ILPs we restrict ourself to weights w i which differ by at least one whenever they are different. (We may simply use integer weights, which could result in harder problems for the ILP solver.) To interlink the x U with the w i and q we use (14) q
where M is an suitably large constant fulfilling (14) and (15) and we have to evaluate the deviation
To this end we set s = 
Of course we can apply similar adjustments for this ILP formulation as we did for the one modeling the ShapleyShubik index to restrict the voting method χ, described by the x U , to complete simple games or weighted voting games.
4.1. Simplification for Conjecture 1. In order to computationally prove Conjecture 1 for the Shapley-Shubik index and small n we remove some variables and constraints from the previous ILP formulation. Since for the
we can delete all variables and constraints for i ≥ 3:
x ∅ = 0,
AN EXHAUSTIVE ENUMERATION APPROACH FOR THE INVERSE POWER INDEX PROBLEM
The conceptionally easiest exact algorithm to solve the inverse power index problem is to loop over the finite set of all voting methods and to pick that one that minimizes the deviation between the desired and the achieved power distribution. Table 3 proves this approach to be infeasible for simple games and n ≥ 8. For complete simple games there exists a very effective parameterization, see [2] . But, to our knowledge, nobody has determined the number of complete simple games for n ≥ 10 yet. On the one hand the fraction of complete simple games which are weighted voting games tends to zero as the number of voters tends to infinity, but on the other hand no parameterization of weighted voting games is known. Several recursive constructions, mostly using super classes of weighted voting games, are presented in the literature [11, 12, 7, 19] . Here we will describe the approach of [7, 6] which exhaustively generates the whole class of complete simple games in the first run and afterwards checks each complete simple game whether it is weighted or not via a linear program, see also [24, 13] . One variant is given by
For n = 9 voters it seems inconceivable to solve 284432730174 linear programs in order to determine all weighted voting games, nevertheless this is -more or less -what was done in [23] 4 . A more effective way is described in [13] and uses partial complete simple games.
As mentioned before a complete simple game can be characterized by its set W of shift-minimal winning vectors. Now we want to exhaustively generate complete simple games for a given number of voters using an orderly generation approach, see [21] , i. e. we start with an empty set W and add shift-minimal winning vectors, which are decreasing with respect to the lexicographical ordering ≤ lex 5 , step by step. In the corresponding generation tree for a node W all successors W fulfill W ⊆ W and y < lex x for all x ∈ W , y ∈ W \W . Now let L and L be the set of all shift-maximal losing coalitions corresponding to W and W . For a given set W = ∅ with lexicographically smallest element w we defineL :
v u , where B = {0, 1} and condense the shift-maximal vectors ofL to a setL ⊆L. With this we haveL ⊆ L andL ⊆ L for all successors of W . Thus whenever the previous linear program where W is replaced by W and L is replaced byL is infeasible, we can prune the whole search tree below node W . Let us have an example for n = 7 voters to illustrate the proposed algorithm. For the partial set W = {1110000, 1101010, 1001111} of shift-minimal winning vectors we can determine the partial seṫ L = {1101000, 1011010, 1100110, 1101001, 0101111} of shift-maximal losing vectors. Here 1101000 is an element ofL since we have 1101000 ≺ 1110000 ∈ W . Since the linear program corresponding to W andL is infeasible we know that none of the complete simple games given by the set W ∪ X of shift-maximal winning vectors is weighted, where X ⊂ {0101111, 0101110, 0101101, 0011111, 0011110, 0011101} .
So at least 7 complete games are shown to be non-weighted by solving one linear program.
Using the concept of orderly generation and partial complete games drastically reduces computation times. However the number of weighted voting games for n = 10 voters remains unknown. So this approach is limited to rather small numbers of voters.
5.1.
A branch&bound approach for the inverse power index problem for weighted voting games. Since we will see in Section 6 that the LP relaxation of our ILP models from Section 4 is rather weak we propose a branch&bound algorithm based on the discrete structure of partial complete games.
As in Section 5 we start with an empty set W of the shift-minimal winning vectors. Again we generate complete simple games via orderly generation and prune the subtree of W whenever W can not be extended to a weighted voting game. To further prune the search tree we additionally use the information of W and the partial setL of shiftmaximal losing vectors to determine some of the x U -values in the ILPs of Section 4. We need a computationally cheap lower bound on the deviation between the values of the given power index for all voting methods χ below node W and the desired power distribution d. If the best known solution so far is better than this lower bound, we can prune the search tree. A quite natural candidate for such a lower bound is the LP relaxation of our ILP models from Section 4. To know good solutions right in the beginning of our branch&bound tree we may utilize any heuristics for the inverse power index problem. In this paper we consider Leech's algorithm. As a realistic input instance for the inverse power index problem we use the 27 countries of the European Union with population numbers pop i given in Table 5 . Instance EU n consists of the n countries with the largest population, where the desired power is given by
i. e. we apply Penrose square root law. In Table 6 and Table 7 we state the results for simple games, complete simple games, and weighted voting games, respectively, using the Shapley-Shubik power index. The weighted voting games corresponding to For n ≤ 5 the optimal solutions for simple games and complete simple games coincide. For larger n simple games admit better approximations but require a huge amount of cpu time. For n ≤ 9 the optimal solutions for complete simple games and weighted voting games coincide. We would like to remark that for weighted voting games the Inequalities (14) and (15) would suffice if the y-variables are binaries but adding the valid Inequalities (13) drastically reduces the necessary cpu time.
We would like to remark that our ILP formulations for the inverse power index problem have a large integrality gap so that the lower bound stays zero for a long time during the solution process. Being more precisely we state the lower LP-bounds for the instances EU n for 1 ≤ n ≤ 15 players. It turns out that these bounds coincide for simple games, complete simple, and weighted voting games, but there are differences in the necessary computation times. The simple games for n ≥ 13 took 14 seconds, 1 minute, and 6 minutes, respectively. For complete simple games the computation times for n ≥ 13 are 2 seconds, 8 seconds, and 4 minutes. Solving the linear programs for weighted voting games with n ≥ 13 took substantially longer: 4 minutes, 3 minutes and 55 minutes. For the instances hard n , see below, we remark that for all considered voting methods and 2 ≤ n ≤ 16 voters the lower LP-bound was given by zero and that we have observed a similar behavior of the computation times. Since the given LP formulation is that weak, in terms of the integrality gap, we might use the general restrictions on the achievable power vectors from Section 3. Another possibility to obtain a lower bound is to drop the xvariables from our ILP formulations and to aggregate the y i,U -variables to z i,|U | -variables:
Although the resulting lower bound, see the sixth column in Table 7 6 , is valid even for simple games, it turns out to be very useful, at least for small n. If we drop Equation (33) Following Conjecture 1 and 2 for n ≥ 2 we consider the instances hard n corresponding to the desired power distribution d = (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ). In Table 9 and Table 10 we list the results for simple games, complete simple games, and weighted voting games, respectively, using the Shapley-Shubik power index. TABLE 10 . Results for the desired power distribution (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) using the ShapleyShubik power index.
In Table 11 and Table 12 we list the results for simple games, complete simple games, and weighted voting games, respectively, using the Banzhaf power index. 
POWER DISTRIBUTIONS WHICH ARE HARD TO APPROXIMATE
In the previous section we have computationally shown that the desired power distribution (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) is hard to approximate by Shapley-Shubik or Banzhaf power vectors. Since it is reported that the proposed heuristics for the inverse power index problem perform well on practical instances one may conjecture that achievable power vectors are dense in those regions which are of practical importance and that the bad approximation property of (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) is a very singular phenomenon.
To shed some light on this matter we will consider two dimensional projections of the set of all achievable power distributions for small n. For 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n and a (normalized) power index P we define A P i,j = {(x, y) | ∃ wvg χ consisting of n ordered voters with P(i) = x, P(j) = y} .
to be the set of all achievable power vectors for ordered weighted voting games consisting of n voters and a given power index P. By ordered we mean that voter i is as least as powerful as voter i + 1 for all 1 ≤ i < n. 
Proof. Since we assume P(1) ≥ P(2) ≥ · · · ≥ P(n) we have x ≥ y and P(h) ≥ P(j) for all h ≤ j. Inserting this into n h=1 P(h) = 1 yields the stated inequalities.
In Figure 2 we illustrate these sets for 6 ≤ n ≤ 9 and P ∈ {BZ, SS} in the following way. We have A For (x, y) is ruled out by Lemma 1 we use red pixels and otherwise a scale of colors from dark blue to green. Here we use dark blue if (x, y) (actually all points in the near of (x, y)) is not contained in A P 1,2 . By light blue we denote that some elements of A P 1,2 are in the near of (x, y) and by green we denote the case when there are many elements of A P 1,2 are in the near of (x, y). The value for voter 1 increases from left to right and the value for voter 2 increases from top to bottom. The graphics on the left hand side of Figure 2 correspond to the Banzhaf power index and those on the right hand side to the Shapley Shubik power index.
By a look at Figure 2 it seems that there might exist a certain subset of [0, 1] 2 which remains empty (or dark blue) if n tends to infinity and we factor out the intrinsic discrete nature of the problem. But of course proving such a property might be a very challenging task.
CONCLUSION
With the inverse power index problem we have presented a very challenging optimization problem of practical importance. Besides exhaustive enumeration we have developed the first exact algorithm to tackle this problem via an ILP formulation. The first computational results are very promising but of course a lot of work using more sophisticated techniques from integer linear (or non-linear) programming has to be done. We give a very precise conjecture on the power distributions with the worst case approximation property and reveal some structure of the set of achievable power distributions by the Banzhaf and the Shapley Shubik power index. In our opinion it would be very challenging to prove these conjectures. Another open problem, which might be not too hard to solve, is to prove an analogue of Alon's and Edelman's result for the Shapley Shubik or other power indices. We leave open the problem to design a practical algorithm for the inverse power index problem, i. e. an algorithm combining fast primal heuristics and techniques for lower bounds in order to solve the problem either exactly or with a certain error guarantee.
APPENDIX A. REGIONS WHICH ARE HARD TO APPROXIMATE
In Conjecture 1 and Conjecture 2 we state that the desired power distribution d = (0.75, 0.25, 0, . . . ) is the worst possible example with respect to approximation in the · 1 -norm using one of the three presented voting methods and the Shapley-Shubik power index. In this section we want to show that there are further desired power distributions which are equally hard to approximate, at least for small n.
We restrict ourselves on complete simple games and weighted voting games, which coincide for n ≤ 5 voters. For n ≤ 2 and the Shapley-Shubik or the Banzhaf power index we only have the following achievable power distributions s Since there exists only one such theoretically possible desired power distribution we cannot say something interesting for n = 1 voters. Lemma 2. For n = 2 and the Shapley-Shubik or the Banzhaf power index the regions where min 
(1) For d 1 ≥ 
